Chaos and confusion bring US no closer to resolution on strait of Hormuz

Original article by Patrick Wintour

Donald Trump has taken the war with Iran into a new, murkier phase as the two sides move further and further from the vague memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on 17 June.

And as during the opening phase of the conflict, the US leader’s objectives and methods are clouded in confusion, daily U-turns and boasts that within hours are revealed to be false.

Washington’s short-term aim is clear enough – to regain control of the strait of Hormuz from Iran – and the president seems willing to extend the bombing campaign from beyond Iran’s southern shores to achieve this.

But the resumed fighting is also likely to push oil prices towards $90 a barrel, potentially taking Trump closer to defeats at the US midterm elections that could bequeath him a final two years as a lame, if angry, duck.

In a sign of the strategic chaos, Trump proposed – then almost immediately abandoned – a suggestion that the US could charge tolls for clearing the strait, leaving it unclear if Washington had any vision for the future of the waterway.

Many workable alternatives are available, including models based on the strait of Malacca or the Bosphorus and Dardanelles model, both of which have been discussed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Iran and Oman – the two littoral states – are willing to engage on these, but so derelict is the Washington policymaking machinery that the US has no proposal of its own to offer.

In briefings on Tuesday, the White House insisted that the 20% US toll first announced by Trump the day before was a serious plan, claiming the president had been considering the proposal for a long time.

Hours later, however, the product of Trump’s extensive cogitations was jettisoned after the scale of the revolt from shipping firms, members of his own administration and the region became apparent.

That ever such an idea was even proposed is deeply embarrassing, since so many European leaders (and US officials) were on record saying freedom of navigation was a cornerstone of the rules-based order and a pillar of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, had previously argued that tolls were not compatible with international law.

Only last week the 40-strong IMO council – of which the US is an active member – passed a motion reaffirming “that passage through the strait should remain free of any tolls and charges”.

Addressing the IMO council meeting in London, the US ambassador to the UK, Warren A Stephens, vowed: “The US will continue to champion freedom of navigation and the rule of law – the bedrock principles without which international trade cannot function. The United States will defend these principles vigorously, in every forum, including this one. The IMO must be a forum where the rule of law is upheld – not a venue where coercive powers can exploit procedural gaps to advance their strategic interests.”

He added: “The United States is committed to this organisation and to the principles it represents. But we will also speak honestly about the threats to the rules-based maritime order. A free and open ocean is not guaranteed. It must be defended – through strong standards, strong partnerships and the willingness to call out those who seek to undermine it.”

Trump tried to cover his ignominious tracks by claiming conversations with Gulf leaders showed they were now willing to make substantial investment in the US economy. But it seemed a tenuous cover story, even by his standards: the commitment to invest in the US looks entirely unbankable, as fictional as the $350bn recovery plan referenced in the US-Iran ceasefire agreement.

With the toll off the agenda for now, none of Trump’s remaining options look good.

His single greatest political weakness is that he is still having to use force to reopen the strait of Hormuz – a waterway that was accessible until the point he decided to take Benjamin Netanyahu’s advice, leave the negotiating table and attack Iran.

After nearly five months of war, Trump is in a worse position than when he started.

About 6,000 sailors are still trapped in the strait, which remains controlled by the government in Tehran, which has drawn strength from the Iranian public’s farewell to its assassinated supreme leader. The idea, laid out in the memorandum, that the two sides will agree on the future of Iran’s nuclear programme by 17 August looks entirely fanciful.

Meanwhile, Iran appears to have plentiful supplies of weaponry and continues to pummel US bases in Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain. The latest US administration estimate of the costs of the war, including damage to the bases, is put at $100bn.

When the memorandum was signed a month ago, Trump effectively admitted the military option had not achieved its purpose. If the strait remained closed for much longer there was a serious risk of a global recession, he said, telling CNBC that he did not want to be “a president with a depression on his resume”.

But now the advocates of war are back. Rob Malley, a former US nuclear negotiator, said: “On both sides, there are groups that believe they can bear the costs of escalating tensions and, more importantly, must prove this ability to the other side.”

US hawks still believe Iran will crumble if the reinstated blockade of its ports makes it impossible to export oil.

In Tehran, the chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been allowed to purge his biggest critics inside the parliament. But Ghalibaf is still under daily pressure to explain the purpose of negotiating with a counter party that treats solemn and binding agreements like passing street litter.

What is worse, Trump’s team cannot articulate a strategy for the strait. Joe Biden’s national security adviser Philip Gordon pointed out: “If the United States did not want Iran to take control of the strait, it should not have agreed to a document stating that ‘the Islamic Republic of Iran will make the necessary arrangements for the safe passage of ships’ or that ‘no fees will be charged for 60 days only’. Iran’s attacks on shipping are outrageous, but so was the US failure to clarify what it expected in exchange for the massive financial relief the MoU promised.”

In retrospect it would have made more sense for the US to leave Iran largely in control for 60 days, and insist Tehran get on with demining, rather than trying to speed the process of ships leaving the strait by opening up a new southern route close to the Oman coast.

The debate about the strait is becoming a wider one about security in the Gulf. Writing in Le Monde, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, the Oman foreign minister, argued that the whole premise of Washington’s Iran policy was flawed.

“The combination of excessive local defence spending, the expansion of US bases in the Gulf and an over-the-horizon protective presence was developed and maintained at great cost but to very little real purpose.

“The war has revealed that containment was a myth, a reality acknowledged now even by those who had previously been persuaded that more than 45 years of costly containment was a necessary evil. The gravest threats to the security of the Gulf come not from within the Gulf itself but from decisions and actions taken outside it, above all in Tel Aviv.”